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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE

ANN.

§ 78-2a-2(j) (1953, as amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the District Court's judgment, upon remittitur from the Utah Court
of Appeals, awarding damages to plaintiff/appellee, Susan Slattery ("Slattery") for the value of
certain securities in her account at defendant/appellant Covey & Co., Inc. ("Covey & Co.") and
awarding Slattery attorney's fees and costs.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue One: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings on the
value of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co.
Standard of Review: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings
on the value of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. is a question of
law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270, n.ll (Utah
1993).
Issue Two:

Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings on

Slattery's appellate attorney's fees and costs.
Standard of Review: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to conduct proceedings
on Slattery's attorney's fees and costs is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Id.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On July 7, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its opinion in Susan Slattery

v. Covey & Co., Inc., Case No. 910570-CA ("Slattery I"). In its opinion in Slattery I, the Utah
Court of Appeals, among other things, reversed that portion of the District Court's judgment
granting Slattery an offset for the value of certain securities in her personal account at Covey &
Co. and for credits for certain charges made to an account for Slattery at Covey & Co. designated
as an "error account." The opinion also remanded the case to the trial court for entry of findings
consistent with its opinion as to the reversal of the credits for the error account charges.
2.

On August 6, 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a notice of remittitur in

Slattery I.
3.

On August 18, 1993, counsel for Slattery noticed up a hearing on the issue of the

value of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co.
4.

On September 1, 1993, counsel for Slattery filed three motions seeking attorney's

fees and costs.
5.

On September 2,1993, the district court convened a hearing.

6.

At the September 2, 1993 hearing, counsel for Covey & Co. objected to the court

receiving any evidence on both of the issues of attorney's fees and costs and the value of
securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. on the grounds that the district court's
jurisdiction on remand was limited to the entry of findings as to Slattery's error account at Covey
& Co. consistent with the opinion issued by the Utah Court of Appeals in Slattery I. (Transcript
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of hearing conducted on September 2, 1993, pp. 5-14 [hereafter "Tr. pp. _"].) The district court
overruled the objection and allowed counsel for Slattery to present evidence on the value of the
securities and to present evidence on both attorney's fees and costs relating to Slattery I and
attorney's fees relating to the hearing. (Tr. pp. 56-65.) The district court also addressed the issue
of amending its previous findings regarding credits for charges to Slattery's error account to
conform to the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Slattery I. (Tr. pp. 66-67.)
7.

After the September 2, 1993 hearing, the district court entered findings of fact and

conclusions of law in which it found the value of securities remaining in Slattery's account at
Covey & Co. to be $6,880 for shares of Future Time and $1,687.50 cents for shares of Bell
Weather.
8.

On October 14, 1993 the district court issued a minute entry in which it awarded

attorney's fees and costs related to Slattery I in the amount of $13,552.55, and also awarded
attorney's fees related to the September 2, 1993 hearing in the amount of $1,937.50.
9.

On November 8, 1993, the district court entered judgment in favor of Slattery

against Covey & Co. in the amount of $27,771.26, consisting of Slattery's adjusted error account
credit balance of $3,713.71; the value of the securities remaining in Slattery's personal account at
Covey & Co. in the amount of $8,567.50; attorney's fees related to the September 2, 1993
hearing in the amount of $1,937.50 and attorney's fees and costs relating to Slattery I in the
amount of $13,552.55.
10.

On December 8,1993 Covey & Co. filed a notice of appeal.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The opinion rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals in Slattery I reversed two aspects of
the district court's findings and judgment and remanded the case to the district court for entry of
findings consistent with its opinion as to Slattery's error account. Upon remand, the district court
had jurisdiction only to amend its findings relating to the two charges to Slattery's error account
at Covey & Co. which were found to have been inappropriate. Despite its limited jurisdiction in
this matter, the district court, over the objection of counsel for Covey & Co., heard evidence on
the value of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. and also heard
evidence with respect to attorney's fees and costs related to Slattery I and related to the hearing.
The district court erred in overruling Covey & Co.'s objection to an evidentiary hearing
on the value of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co., and on attorney's fees
and costs. These issues were clearly outside of the district court's jurisdiction on remand and
contrary to the mandate of this Court in Slattery I. The judgment entered by the district court for
the value of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. ($8,567.50) and for
attorney's fees and costs ($15,490.05) should therefore be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS ON THE VALUE OF CERTAIN
SECURITIES IN SLATTERY'S PERSONAL ACCOUNT AT
COVEY & CO.

In Slattery I, Covey & Co. claimed that the district court erred in its findings of fact as to
the valuation of certain securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. and asserted that
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the evidence was insufficient to support that valuation. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed. In its
opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals noted Slattery's testimony at trial that she only kept track of
the value of the stocks in her account "from time to time," that the value of her Future Time
shares was $360; and that the value of her Bell Weather shares was "approximately $1,400,
maybe $1,500." The opinion further observed that after trial, Slattery submitted an affidavit
which set forth numbers of shares and value that differed from her trial testimony. Slattery v.
Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah App. 1993). The Court found that the affidavit was
not a sufficient basis for the value of the stocks because it did not establish an objective basis or
foundation for the valuation nor did it explain the conflict with Slattery's trial testimony. (Id. at
249.) Therefore, the Court held that Slattery was not entitled to judgment for the $6,847.50
offset. (Id. at 249.)
The foregoing portion of the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in Slattery I was final and
unequivocal. The Court simply reversed the district court on this issue, and asked the district
court to do nothing further with respect thereto. This mandate gave no discretion to the district
court to deal in any manner with the value of the securities in Slattery's personal account at
Covey & Co. on remand to the district court.
When an appellate court issues a notice of remittitur remanding a case to the trial court,
the trial court only has jurisdiction to implement the mandate of the Court of Appeals. If the trial
court does anything more than implement that mandate, it exceeds its jurisdiction.
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In Bryfogle v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 739 P.2d 819 (Ariz. App. 1987) the appellee,
Bryfogle, was discharged from his position with the appellant, the Arizona Department of
Corrections. After an administrative hearing, the dismissal was adopted by the Arizona State
Personnel Board. Bryfogle appealed to the superior court and received a ruling in his favor. The
Arizona Dept. of Corrections then appealed to the Court of Appeals of Arizona. The Court of
Appeals of Arizona reversed the superior court's decision and reinstated Bryfogle's dismissal.
After an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration and the denial of a petition for review in the
Arizona Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals of Arizona issued the mandate to the superior
court ordering the superior court to comply with its decision. In the meantime, the United States
Supreme Court decided Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct.
1487 (1985). Bryfogle then filed petitions for permission to file motions for reconsideration with
the Arizona Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Arizona seeking a ruling on the
applicability of LoudermilL Bryfogle's petitions were denied by the Arizona Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals of Arizona. Thereafter, Bryfogle moved the superior court to modify the
mandate of the Court of Appeals of Arizona to comport with LoudermilL The superior court
granted the motion entering judgment in favor of Bryfogle. In doing so, the superior court found
that it had jurisdiction, and that the denial by the Arizona Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals of Arizona of permission to file motions for reconsideration was not a disposition on the
merits of the matters raised in the petitions. Both parties framed the issue on appeal as whether
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the superior court had jurisdiction to supersede the mandate issued by the Court of Appeals of
Arizona.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona concluded that the superior court had exceeded its
jurisdiction and reversed the decision of the superior court. In doing so, the court stated: "Where
a mandate has issued giving a trial court specific directions, the trial court is generally not free to
deviate from the mandate. Tovrea v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 295, 419 P.2d 79 (1966)."
Bryfogle, supra at p. 821. The Court of Appeals of Arizona stated that: "All that remained was
for the trial court .to reverse its original judgment . . . ." Bryfogle, supra at p. 821. (See also
Amax Magnesium v. State Tax Com'n. 848 P.2d 715, 717-18 (Utah App. 1993), reversed on other
grounds, Amax Magnesium v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 874 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994); Carrillo v.
State, 817 P.2d 493, 499 (Ariz. App. 1991); and Cerminara v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 765
P.2d 182 (Nev. 1988).
Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states:
The court may reverse, affirm, modify, or otherwise dispose of any order or
judgment appealed from. If the findings of fact in a case are incomplete, the court
may order the trial court or agency to supplement, modify, or complete the
findings to make them conform to the issues presented and the facts as found from
the evidence and may direct the trial court or agency to enter judgment in
accordance with the findings as revised. The court may also order a new trial or
further proceedings to be conducted. If a new trial is granted, the court may pass
upon and determine all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the
appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.
This provision further supports the proposition that the trial court cannot operate outside the
specific mandate of the opinion rendered by an appellate court.
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The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court on
remand in Street v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 191 P.2d 153, 158 (1948). In that case, the
trial court had tried issues relating to whether or not a partnership existed between plaintiff and
defendant; whether or not that partnership had been terminated, and if so, when; whether or not
one of the defendants was a proper party to the action; and certain procedural questions which
were not relevant to the appeal. During the trial of the case, evidence as to partnership profits or
related matters was excluded until a determination was first made as to whether or not defendant
was entitled to any relief against plaintiffs. The decision of the trial court was the subject of an
interlocutory appeal and therefore the only issues before the court were those that had been
litigated by the parties in the trial court. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial
court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the trial court permitted
defendant to amend his complaint to demand an accounting on the basis of reasonable rental
value of the partnership property.

The plaintiffs objected to defendant being allowed to

introduce the new issue of accounting on a rental basis into the case. Plaintiffs took the position
that defendant should only be able to seek an accounting from plaintiffs on a profit basis, which
was defendant's position prior to the interlocutory appeal.
The Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:
As a general rule, where a judgment or decree is affirmed or reversed and
remanded with directions to enter a particular judgment, the trial court may not
permit amended or supplemental proceedings to be framed to try rights already
settled. 9 Bancroft, op. cit., Sec. 7430. This rule is not only reasonable, but
necessary, if litigation is ever to come to an end. After an appellate court has once
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ruled upon issues presented to it, such ruling becomes the law of the case, and the
trial court is bound to follow it, even though it considers the ruling erroneous.
Street, supra. 191 P.2dat 158.
The Utah Supreme Court also made the following statement: "But where the entire case
is not settled by the appellate tribunal where certain issues are left open by its judgment or
decree, the trial court ordinarily has discretion to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as
to those matters which have been left open." Street, supra 91 P.2d at 1158. {See also Call v.
City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah 1986).)
In Slattery I, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
The remand was for the sole purpose of correcting the findings of fact to eliminate credits given
to Slattery by the district court for charges to her error account at Covey & Co. The Utah Court
of Appeals did not order a new trial or order further proceedings to be conducted as to the value
of securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. The district court had no jurisdiction
outside of the mandate. There was simply no authority for the district court to conduct further
proceedings on this issue. Therefore, the district court's judgment for $8,567.50 for the value of
securities in Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. should be reversed.
II.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS ON SLATTERY'S APPELLATE
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

In Slattery I, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed the issue of attorney's fees.

At

footnote 4, the Court stated, "Slattery also seeks attorney's fees on appeal, based on the
employment contract. However, she was not awarded attorney fees at trial and did not appeal
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from that determination. Because Slattery does not present any argument to support her request
for fees on appeal, we decline to address the issue." Slattery, 857 P.2d at 249.
The foregoing language simply cannot be construed as a remand of the attorney's fees
issue to the district court. Had the Court determined that an award of attorney's fees and costs to
Slattery was appropriate, it would have instructed the district court to determine the proper
amount of attorney's fees on remand and Rule 34(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
would have become applicable with respect to costs. Instead, the Court declined to address the
issue due to Slattery's failure to present any supporting argument. The only way that Slattery
could have properly addressed the issue of appellate attorney's fees and costs was in a motion to
the Utah Court of Appeals itself.
In Vinton Eppsco, Inc. of Albuquerque v. Showe Homes, Inc., 638 P.2d 1070 (N.M.
1981), appellant Eppsco had sued appellee Showe and William Coady for non-payment for
plumbing materials.

Eppsco obtained judgment against Coady and executed a writ of

garnishment on Showe. The Valencia County District Court dissolved the writ of garnishment
and awarded Showe attorney's fees pursuant to a provision of the New Mexico statutes. On
appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the county district court's action and issued a
mandate remanding the cause to the county district court for further proceedings consistent with
the memorandum of opinion. In its appeal, Showe had urged the court to remand to the trial
court for an assessment of appellate attorney's fees and the New Mexico Supreme Court had
made no mention of a remand for that purpose in its mandate.
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On the second appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the county district court
had exceeded its mandate on remand and therefore was without jurisdiction to award appellate
attorney's fees. The Court stated:
The district courts have only such jurisdiction on remand as the opinion and
mandate of an appellate court specifies. Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 57,
582 P.2d 1270 (1978). It is well settled that the duty of a lower court on remand
is to comply with the mandate of the appellate court, and to obey the directions
therein without variation, even though the mandate may be erroneous. Glaser v.
Dannelley, 26 N.M. 371, 193 P.76 (1920).
Eppsco, supra, at p. 1071.
The New Mexico Supreme Court further stated that "[a]ppellate courts have authority to
either make an allowance of attorney fees on appeal or to remand to the lower court for that
purpose. Coons v. Coons, 6 Wash. App. 123, 491 P.2d 1333 (1971)." Eppsco, supra, at p. 1071.
However, the court noted that it had considered Showe's request to remand the case to the county
district court for an assessment of appellate attorney's fees and decided against remanding for
that purpose.
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Slattery I was to decline to address the issue
of attorney's fees. The mandate to the district court therefore denied it jurisdiction with respect
to appellate attorney's fees. Based on its lack of jurisdiction to address the issue, the district
court's award of appellate attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $13,552.55 should be
reversed.
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Because the Utah Court of Appeals' remand of Slattery I for amendment of the findings
of fact to conform with the opinion did not leave open issues regarding the value of securities in
Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co., or appellate attorney's fees incurred by Slattery, the
hearing at which these issues were addressed was entirely outside the district court's jurisdiction
and unnecessary.

Therefore, the district court's award of attorney's fees in the amount of

$1,937.50 in connection with that hearing should also be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the district court's judgment for the value of securities in
Slattery's personal account at Covey & Co. in the amount of $8,567.50 and attorney's fees and
costs in the amount of $15,490.05 should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this 17 day of January, 1995.
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